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DeBellis: A Natural Next-Step

A GROUP HOME EXCLUSIVELY FOR MARRIED COUPLES
WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES:
A NATURAL NEXT-STEP
by Marissa DeBellis*

I.

INTRODUCTION
Q: Why do you want to get married?
A: We love each other. That‟s why. I want to get married,
and live with him, and I‟ll be there for him, and he‟ll be there
for me . . .
Q: What do you think it means to be married?
A: To be in love and complete.
Q: What do you think your life will be like after you are married?
A: I want to live on my own. I want to move on, get my own
life with [him, he is] my partner in life. He‟ll be there for me,
no matter what.
Q: [Are you afraid of moving away from your home?]
A: I‟m a twenty-six year old woman and I want to get married
and move on. . . . He want[s] to get married. And the point is
the he [has] fallen in love with me and not anyone else. He
wants me. That‟s what he wants. That‟s what I want. We
want to get married . . . as soon as possible.1

*

Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, May 2012; B.A.
Fairfield University. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends
for their unconditional love and support throughout my educational career, with particular
thanks to my loving parents. Special thanks go to the talented members of the Touro Law
Review for their advice, support, assistance, and friendship. Lastly, I would like to dedicate
this Comment to my cousin, Amanda, for providing me not only with the inspiration to write
about this topic, but also for a lifetime of inspiration to live to my fullest potential, something I hope she will be able to do as a result of this Comment.
1
Interview with Amanda Baldwin, in Yaphank, N.Y. (Oct. 3, 2010) (on file with author).
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The responses above came from my cousin, Amanda Baldwin, a woman with Down syndrome2 considered to have mild mental
retardation.3 She and her boyfriend of three years are engaged and
plan to marry. He is also developmentally disabled4 and currently
lives in a group home.5 The two plan to live a life that they consider
“normal,” including a wedding, cohabitation, and a sexual relationship. Although Ms. Baldwin‟s responses show that she has a clear
understanding of the emotional commitment of marriage and its
meaning, she will face the possible dissolution of her upcoming marriage due to her lack of capacity to give consent,6 and will have great
difficulty finding an appropriate residence in which both she and her
future husband can live as a married couple.7
2

See generally Down syndrome, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Sept. 26, 2010),
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/down-syndrome (“Down syndrome is a chromosomal condition that is associated with intellectual disability . . . . The degree of intellectual disability
varies, but it is usually mild to moderate.”).
3
See GEORGE S. BAROFF & J. GREGORY OLLEY, MENTAL RETARDATION: NATURE, CAUSE,
AND MANAGEMENT 8 (Brunner/Mazel, 3d ed. 1999) (identifying four characterizations of
mental retardation: mild, moderate, severe, and profound). While many degrees within mental retardation are often described in terms of the range of abilities the person may have or
the responsibilities he or she understands, the initial determination typically begins with Intelligence Quotient (IQ) test performance. Id. at 8. Persons with mild mental retardation fall
within an IQ range of 52-69, while those with moderate mental retardation fall within an IQ
range of 36-54, those with severe mental retardation typically have an IQ range of 20-39,
and those with profound mental retardation typically have an IQ range of 0-24. Id. at 9.
4
See id. at 247 (describing developmental disabilities as “disorders presented at birth or
arising in childhood that are chronic in nature and require similar habilitative services . . . .
[T]he term now encompasses all developmental disorders—sensory and physical as well as
cognitive—that significantly affect major areas of daily living.”).
5
Group homes, or community residential facilities, are homes in residential areas housing
anywhere from four to fifteen unrelated individuals with similar disabilities (mental, physical, or addiction) staffed with people that provide supervision and services to the residents.
Stephen F. Hayes, The “Usual Incidents of Citizenship”: Rethinking When People with Disabilities Must Participate in Public Variance Proceedings, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2044, 2047
(2009); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 686.99(l) (2012) (defining a community residence as “[a] facility providing housing, supplies and services for persons who are developmentally disabled and who, in addition to these basic requirements, need supportive interpersonal relationships, supervision, and training assistance in the activities of daily
living.”).
6
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7(2) (McKinney 2011) (“A marriage is void if either party
. . . [i]s incapable of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding.”).
7
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, Senior Ed. Specialist for The Cody Ctr. for Autism
and Developmental Disabilities at Stony Brook Univ., in Stony Brook, N.Y. (Feb. 10, 2011)
(on file with author). Bonnie Guimela is a social worker with extensive experience working
with the developmentally disabled. She currently heads the Sexual Education and Relation-
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In an attempt to make their plans a reality, Ms. Baldwin and
her boyfriend, along with two other interested couples with similar
disabilities, seek to create a group home designed exclusively for
married couples with developmental disabilities. While this kind of
group home may seem to some like a wonderful service, and even a
fairly logical concept, such a group home does not yet exist, and finding support for its creation has proven to be an incredibly daunting
task. While there are married couples with developmental disabilities
that live in group homes with other unmarried individuals,8 there are
no group homes in the United States designed specifically to provide
a supportive environment exclusively for married couples.
This Comment advocates for the development of this unique
and unprecedented group home, establishing the basis for its creation
by demonstrating that public policy supports providing this type of
environment as a necessary service for the distinct group of individuals seeking it. This Comment will discuss the history of how the law
has treated those with mental disabilities and will demonstrate that
with the vast progression in the treatment of, and the rights afforded
to, individuals with developmental disabilities, a group home designed specifically for married couples is a natural next-step in the
expansion and personalization of the services provided to these individuals. Additionally, because Ms. Baldwin and her boyfriend will
marry and live in New York, this Comment will not only discuss
general guidelines governing this unique situation, but will also pay
particular attention to New York regulations.
Section II will outline the progression of marital rights of the
developmentally disabled in order to demonstrate the evolution of
rights afforded to the developmentally disabled while also revealing
one of the many hurdles the couple will face in attempting to have the
“normal” life they so desperately seek. Section III will identify the
housing options available for married couples with developmental
disabilities unable to live independently and the popularization of
group homes. Lastly, section IV will address, and subsequently disship Training Division of The Cody Center for Autism and Developmental Disabilities at
Stony Brook University, and is currently working with couples seeking to get married and
live together in a group home setting. See generally The Cody Center For Autism and Developmental
Disabilities,
STONY
BROOK
UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL
CENTER,
http://www.stonybrookmedicalcenter.org/codycenter (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
8
Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
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credit, the likely opposition to the construction of this type of residential facility.
The analysis in this Comment will focus primarily on the
rights of individuals with mental retardation and other developmental
disabilities who are unable to live independently and require the services of at-home care, institutions, or other residential facilities. It
will not discuss services for the mentally ill or individuals with cognitive disabilities considered to be “high-functioning” or merely
“mentally weak” because individuals in these classifications have additional living options and tend to face fewer restrictions due to their
heightened capacity to understand the consequences of their decisions.
II.

MARITAL RIGHTS OF THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED

As humans, we have social and biological desires to marry,
live together, and create a family. Unsurprisingly, individuals with
developmental disabilities share these same ambitions.9 However,
societal views have historically resisted the idea of the developmentally disabled engaging in romantic relationships.10 While the treatment of individuals with developmental disabilities has evolved extensively in the past few decades, with the trend toward
deinstitutionalization11 and the recognition of their right against discrimination,12 there is still significant room for growth, particularly in
attempting to change society‟s views of this often stigmatized group.

9
J. Dale Munro, Couple Therapy and Support: A Positive Model for People with Intellectual Disabilities, NADD, http://www.thenadd.org/cgi-bin/checkmember.pl?page=pages/
membership/bulletins/v10n5a1 (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
10
Id. (attributing this resistance largely to fears of sexual relationships that will result in
pregnancy).
11
See Laura E. Hortas, Asylum Protection for the Mentally Disabled: How the Evolution
of Rights for the Mentally Ill in the United States Created a “Social Group,” 20 CONN. J.
INT‟L L. 155, 161-62 (2004) (discussing the trend moving away from the institutionalization
of those with mental disabilities and toward community care, with the government adopting
the position that moving the mentally ill to an institution “should only be used as a last
resort”).
12
See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2006). The Americans with Disabilities Act specifically mandates “the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities” on a national level as a result of several findings warranting a
need for such legislation. Id. at § 12101(a), (b)(1).
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Historical Background

It is well known that the developmentally disabled have a
substantial history of mistreatment and degradation in the codification of American law.13 Thankfully, there has been a steady trend
among Congress and state legislatures toward removing the stigma
traditionally placed upon the developmentally disabled and “actively
encourag[ing] the „normalization‟ of people with disabilities.”14
However, this “reform movement has had little effect on the right of
the people with mental retardation to marry.”15
For much of American history, individuals with mental disabilities were essentially uninhibited by state legislation regarding
marriage and procreation.16 The same standard of determining
whether a marriage would be upheld applied equally to both the mentally disabled population and the rest of society, with the only deciding factor being whether the two individuals “were able to understand
the basic concept of marriage.”17 However, by the beginning of the
twentieth century, this outlook changed severely with the rise of the
Eugenics movement.18 During this movement, eugenic ideals inspired laws restricting the right of developmentally disabled persons
to marry based upon “a belief that social engineering through controlled or selective reproduction could help purify the human race.”19
In 1896, Connecticut enacted the first piece of legislation prohibiting
the mentally disabled community from marrying, and by 1914, over
twenty states had followed the trend.20 With an interest in “societal
productivity,” states disallowed marriage of people with mental dis13

See id. at § 12101(a)(2)-(5) (finding that individuals with disabilities have had a long
history of discrimination, both socially and politically, that persisted leading up to the
enactment of this legislation, for which these individuals “often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.”).
14
Brooke Pietrzak, Marriage Laws and People with Mental Retardation: A Continuing
History of Second Class Treatment, 17 DEV. IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1, 1-2 (1997).
15
Id. at 2.
16
See Matthew D. Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny of Eugenics: Autonomy Gone
AWOL, 15 CARDOZO J. INT‟L & COMP. L. 371, 375 (2007).
17
Id.
18
Jonathan Matloff, Idiocy Lunacy, and Matrimony: Exploring Constitutional Challenges
to State Restrictions on Marriages of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC, POL‟Y & L. 497, 501 (2009).
19
Id.
20
Hortas, supra note 11, at 159.
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abilities and forced sterilization because of the belief that mental retardation would be passed on to their children.21 Some courts also
based their decisions on unreliable scientific data, stating that, “idiocy, insanity, imbecility, and criminality are congenital and hereditary,”22 in order to promote the state‟s interest in protecting the public
from “afflicted” offspring.23 In 1927, the United States Supreme
Court showed its official support of this state interest by upholding
the validity of a Virginia law that gave the superintendents of mental
institutions the authority to sterilize patients in order to prevent the
transmission of “imbecility” through procreation.24
The Court‟s decision, among other things, marked a shift in
American culture, after which much of society began to view people
with mental disabilities as outcasts, forcing sterilization and creating
mental institutions with the hidden agenda of further isolating this
population from society and, in effect, from the opposite sex.25 This
practice stigmatized the group and indoctrinated Americans with the
belief that this group of people needed to be isolated, both from society and from each other; a stigma that, in many ways, still perpetuates today in the discouragement of marriage through legislation.26
The end of World War II marked a call for reform that resulted in substantial changes to the health care system for the mentally disabled.27 However, the reform was focused primarily on improving the quality of care provided by institutions and was not reflected
in marriage statutes.28

21

Matloff, supra note 18, at 501-02.
State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75, 76 (Wash. 1912) (upholding a sentence requiring a man
found guilty of rape to be subjected to a vasectomy); see also Smith v. Command, 204 N.W.
140, 142 (Mich. 1925) (citing to medical studies that show “a reasonable degree of certainty
that feeble-mindedness is hereditary”).
23
Matloff, supra note 18, at 501.
24
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (referring to “imbeciles” as a class of people
that “sap the strength of the State,” and remarking that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough”).
25
See Martin, supra note 16, at 375; Matloff, supra note 18, at 500.
26
See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing many current marriage laws that severely restrict and even prohibit marriage of a person with mental disabilities).
27
Hortas, supra note 11, at 161.
28
See id.; Pietrzak, supra note 14, at 2.
22
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The Current Status of Marriage Laws and New
York’s Voidable Marriage

Unfortunately, some statutes still harbor the language of the
eugenics-era in their text.29 Using words such as “imbecile,” “idiot,”
“feeble-minded,” “lunatic,” or “mental deficients” to classify all degrees of mental incapacity, states have lumped all those with mental
disabilities into one group in which all “person[s] of any degree of
unsoundness of mind” would be restricted in their ability to marry,
further allowing the eugenic-era perspective that people with mental
disabilities are sub-human or in some way defective to be perpetuated
even in modern society.30 Most states have attempted to deviate from
this outlook by amending the terms used within the statutory text, but
there has been little substantive change in the law.31
At common law, and under codification in certain jurisdictions, the marriage of a person of “unsound mind,” who would therefore be deemed incapable of understanding the nature, duties, and
consequences of a marriage, is absolutely void.32 When a marriage is
said to be completely void, it may never be validated.33 In essence,
because no marital rights are secured and the couple would be able to
act as if the marriage never occurred, issues such as the legitimacy of
children and property disputes have proven to be cumbersome and
unjust.34 However, in most United States jurisdictions, a marriage
involving at least one party with a mental disability is not void, but
rather voidable, and will remain valid until either party contests the
marriage contract or seeks an annulment.35
29

See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1304(c) (West 2010) (prohibiting a marriage license to be issued to an individual that is “weak minded, insane, [or] of unsound mind”);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-109 (West 2010) (indicating that a marriage license cannot be issued to someone that “appears . . . at the time drunk, insane, or an imbecile”); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §512 (West 2010) (declaring that a marriage contract may be annulled when
either party was “an idiot or lunatic” at the time of the marriage); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-3103(a)(3)(A) (West 2010) (stating that marriages are voidable, and void when declared by
the court to be so, when either party “was an insane person, idiot, or imbecile”).
30
Pietrzak, supra note 14, at 2-3.
31
Id. at 3, 33.
32
Id. at 33.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See Pietrzak, supra note 14, at 33.
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In New York, a marriage is void from its nullity, and therefore voidable, when either party “[i]s incapable of consenting to a
marriage for want of understanding.”36 The statute does not attempt
to define “want of understanding,” nor does it clearly separate the
mentally ill from the developmentally disabled in its general rule.
However, the two groups are treated substantially differently when
one party seeks an annulment of his or her voidable marriage, 37 signifying the need for more specificity in the voidable marriage statute.
The broad language dangerously forces a spectrum of disabilities, and
abilities, to fall within the statute.
Significantly, the statute does not require an initial showing of
capacity before a couple with developmental disabilities obtains a
marriage license or has a wedding. Instead, it merely provides remedies for the party seeking to annul or void a marriage due to lack of
capacity,38 resulting in case law that only explains how to get out of
marriage as opposed to how to enter into one.39 This has left many
people with disabilities clueless about the process of getting married
and has allowed private agencies caring for these individuals to control the process by requiring each person seeking marriage to pass a
test “proving” that he or she has the capacity to consent to a marriage
and to engage in a sexual relationship.40
C.

The Capacity Requirement

The “unsound mind” and “want of understanding” standards
imply a requirement of a certain mental capacity in order for the marriage to be valid. A problem arises, however, as a result of the va-

36

N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7(2).
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140(c). In an action to annul a marriage on the grounds that
a party to the action was mentally retarded at the time of the marriage, the only guideline
enumerated in the New York Domestic Relations Law is that any relative of the mentally
retarded party with an interest in avoiding the marriage may bring the annulment at any time
during the lifetime of either party. Id. However, there are several specific guidelines, distinguishable from the solitary instruction given for mental retardation, listed regarding an
annulment involving a party that is mentally ill. See id.
38
Id.
39
See, e.g., Levine v. Dumbra, 604 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (App. Div. 1993) (providing only
guidelines for showing incompetence rather than competence).
40
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7; discussion infra Part II.C.ii (focusing
on the consent testing requirement and providing examples of tests used in New York).
37
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gueness of these standards because they encompass a significantly
broad spectrum of mental disability. While courts have recognized
the lack of a precise definition of “unsound mind,” they have further
insisted upon the difficulty, and have been reluctant to develop a
comprehensive definition.41 However, in an attempt to narrow a statute‟s constraint on an overly broad group of people, some courts
have specifically stated that mere mental weakness or low intellect is
insufficient to fall within these statutes.42 Most significantly, many
jurisdictions have declared that the individual must have the specific
inability to understand the special nature of the contract of marriage,
and the duties that accompany such a contract, at the time of the marriage in order for the marriage to be void or voidable.43 As one court
described, “[o]rdinarily, lack of mental capacity, which renders a party incapable of entering into a valid marriage contract, must be such
that it deprives him [or her] of the ability to understand the objects of
marriage, its ensuing duties and undertakings, its responsibilities and
relationship.”44 Likewise, an individual may have the specific capacity to understand the special nature of the contract of marriage
while potentially lacking a similar capacity to enter into other contracts, and vice versa.45
Typically, mental capacity must relate specifically to the contract of marriage, not necessarily the capacity to contract generally.46
Courts often make the distinction between the two levels of capacity,
many finding that the capacity to enter into a marriage contract is
lower than that required for a business transaction.47 However, this
seems like an unnecessary distinction because the Law of Contracts
41

See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8, 13-14 (N.D. 1960).
See, e.g., Ertel v. Ertel, 40 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1942).
43
See Johnson, 104 N.W.2d at 14.
44
Id.
45
See id. at 17 (stating that different tests apply for determinations of capacity for guardianship purposes and for marriage, resulting in the ability of a person found to be incompetent under a guardianship standard to potentially have sufficient mental capacity to enter into
a valid marriage contract).
46
See Edmunds v. Edwards, 287 N.W.2d 420, 422 (Neb. 1980) (denying the plaintiff, a
man found by the Court to be “mentally retarded,” the ability to annul his marriage because,
at the time of its inception, the degree of his mental incapacity was not of the nature that
rendered him incompetent to enter into a marriage due to the fact that he had adequate capacity to understand the marriage contract and the duties that follow).
47
See, e.g., Ertel, 40 N.E.2d at 89 (stating that Illinois requires less capacity for a marriage contract than for executing an ordinary business contract).
42
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focuses on an understanding of the specific transaction and whether
the “transaction in its result is one which a reasonably competent person might have made.”48
The ways in which courts classified the differences between
marriage and business contracts became more creative over time. For
example, one court relied upon emotional factors rather than mental
abilities, stating that, “marriage depends to a great extent on sentiment, attachment, and affection which persons with equal, as well as
those with stronger intellects feel and . . . it does not depend, to the
extent that ordinary contracts do, on the exercise of clear reason, discernment, and sound judgment.”49 Another court went even further
as to say that while marriage is referred to as a civil contract under
the law, it is actually nothing of the sort.50 Rather, “[w]hat persons
establish by entering into matrimony, is not a contractual relation, but
a social Status; and the only essential features of the transactions are
that the participants are of legal capacity to assume that Status, and
freely consent so to do.”51
1.

Measuring Capacity

Whether explaining mental incapacity by analogizing it to the
links of a chain,52 or simply ignoring degrees of developmental disability, state courts have consistently struggled to create specific
guidelines in order to determine whether a party is incompetent and
the degree to which the individual‟s disability contributes to this lack
of understanding.53 In an attempt to create a standard for entering into a marriage, Maine adopted legislation stating that, “[a] person who
is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental retardation to the
extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make,
communicate or implement responsible decisions concerning that
48

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (1979).
Griffin v. Beddow, 268 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1954).
50
Edmunds, 287 N.W.2d at 425.
51
Id. (quoting Univ. of Mich. v. McGukin, 89 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Neb. 1902)).
52
Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565, 567 (1856) (attempting to explain degrees of “unsoundness” by stating, “[t]he faculties of a sound mind are links, composing a chain. These
links may be worn and weakened, and still the chain exists. Break or destroy one of them,
and the unity and continuity are gone.”).
53
Matloff, supra note 18, at 504.
49
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person‟s property or person is not capable of contracting marriage”54
However, this language completely ignores an individual‟s specific
ability to appreciate the marriage contract and marital relationship,
and creates a standard that rests solely on general disabilities, reminiscent of those requirements necessary for the appointment of a
guardian.55
California made an attempt to provide statutory guidance by
developing a list of factors for analyzing an individual‟s capacity to
perform certain acts.56 The list includes the ability to concentrate,
understand, communicate, reason, and recognize objects and
people.57 This statute, however, is not specific to marriage, and instead applies to a broad list of contractual abilities, including the capacity to contract, execute a will, and make medical decisions.58
While this is a step in a positive direction, general skills such as the
ability to communicate cannot effectively measure an individual‟s
specific capacity to enter into a marriage contract as required by the
courts.
Each state legislature has therefore relied upon case law to
further define the meaning of statutory text. However, many courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, refuse to make such interpretations.59 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,60 the
Court stated that legislation affecting “this large and diversified
group” of mentally disabled persons “is a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary.”61
Despite this seesawing between the courts and the legislature,
54

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(3) (West 2011). The statute also includes a definition of both mental illness and mental retardation, specifically making them separate. Id.
at § 701(3)(A)-(B).
55
Generally, statutes guiding the guardianship appointment for a disabled person require
the individual to lack appreciation and understanding of his or her disability such that it limits his or her ability to care for his or her person or property. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 81.15(b)(1)-(2), (c)(2)-(3) (McKinney 2011).
56
CAL. PROB. CODE § 811(a)(1)-(3) (West 2011).
57
Id. at § 811(a)(1)(C), (2)(B)-(E).
58
Id. at § 811(a).
59
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 442-43.
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a general standard requiring the individual to understand the nature
and consequences of marriage, and comprehend the significance of
being married, at the time the marriage contract was made has
emerged among jurisdictions.62 The conflict here is that case law in
this area focuses on presenting evidence that the individual was incompetent in order to void or annul a marriage rather than presenting
guidelines and standards necessary to demonstrate the proper capacity to contract.63
In practice, particularly among agencies charged with the care
of individuals with mental disabilities, those seeking to marry must
first be tested on their capacity to consent to marriage.64 However, in
actuality, this test does not measure the specific capacity to consent to
the contract of marriage, but instead evaluates the individual‟s capacity to consent to a sexual relationship.65 Unfortunately, many of
the standards used to measure sexual capacity that are acknowledged
in New York come from rape cases in which one of the parties had a
mental defect that rendered him or her incapable of giving consent.66
As a result, much of the focus in this evaluation rests upon the voluntary aspect of the individual‟s behavior.67 New York has also identified a “morality standard,” under which “a person must be mentally
capable of understanding the social mores of sexual behavior . . .
[and] the non-criminal penalties (e.g., ostracism, stigmatization) that
society may impose for conduct it labels as sexually immoral . . .
[such as] sexually exploitive behavior.”68 In practice, this translates
62

Johnson, 104 N.W.2d at 14. It is also well accepted among jurisdictions that this information must be ascertained by the facts on a case-by-case basis. Id. One court stated
that, “[i]t is difficult to lay down any general comprehensive test for determining the degree
of mental capacity required to contract a marriage. Each case must of necessity be decided
on its own facts.” De la Montanya v. De la Montanya, 281 P. 825, 825 (Or. 1929).
63
Levine, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 208 (providing only guidelines for showing incompetence rather than competence).
64
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing how the victim
was unable to consent to sexual activity due to mental incapacity); People v. Cratsley, 653
N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1995) (dealing with the rape of a 33-year-old woman who was incapable
of consenting to sexually activity).
67
BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 251 (stating that consent may be obtained verbally
and behaviorally as long as there is a clear indication that the sexual activity is voluntary).
68
Martin Lyden, Assessment of Sexual Consent Capacity, 25 SEXUALITY AND DISABILITY
3, 5 (2007). Additionally, this article mentions that some other states do not require this
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to the individual knowing and understanding the difference between
appropriate public and private behavior.69 The New York Court of
Appeals emphasized that:
An understanding of coitus encompasses more than a
knowledge of its physiological nature. An appreciation of how it will be regarded in the framework of the
societal environment and taboos to which a person
will be exposed may be far more important. In that
sense, the moral quality of the act is not to be ignored.70
In a later case, the same court asserted that proof of incapacity could
not be evidenced by the individual‟s disability alone, as the law does
not presume that an individual with disabilities is unable to consent to
sex.71 This instruction has led to reliance on consent testing that examines other traits and indicators of an individual‟s ability to understand the nature of a sexual relationship.72
2.

Testing Capacity

Although the New York statute governing marriage does not
require proof of capacity before obtaining a marriage license,73 nongovernmental agencies that serve as legal guardians for the mentally
disabled require that these individuals pass consent tests demonstrating the individual‟s ability to give consent to a sexual relationship.74
Despite the lack of a requirement to prove capacity to marry by the
added understanding of the morality of the sexual act, and instead only demand an understanding of the nature of sexual behavior and its potential consequences. Id. at 6.
69
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 59 (discussing the need for individuals
to know the difference between private and public acts); Interview with Amanda Baldwin,
supra note 1 (demonstrating her understanding of public and private conduct: “Un-private is
like, public, like we‟re going out somewhere and we can‟t do that when we‟re going out . . .
in private you can do anything you want in our room, just me and him together, not me and
the staff . . . [b]ut me and him are husband and wife and that‟s different. That‟s private
stuff.”).
70
Easley, 364 N.E.2d at 1332 (internal citations omitted).
71
Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d at 1165.
72
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
73
See N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 10; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13 (requiring only a marriage
license before the solemnization of the marriage).
74
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
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state legislature, private agencies feel entitled to compel these individuals to satisfactorily pass a consent test according to their professional judgment by manipulating the consent requirement of the New
York Penal Law75 to give them such a power.76 Because an individual may lack consent under the statute because of an incapacity resulting from a mental disability,77 agencies‟ fear of liability and the potential for criminal charges has led the agencies to resort to consent
testing, often using tests drafted by the individual agency or those
given by the New York State Office for People with Developmental
Disabilities (“OPWDD”),78 in order for the couple to gain permission
from the agency to marry.79
To say that there is no clear test for evaluating the capacity to
consent to a sexual relationship is an understatement, making these
testing requirements quite problematic. Not only do the criteria for
measuring capacity to consent to sexual activity vary across jurisdictions, but they also vary within jurisdictions.80 In fact, some states
have no significant guidelines whatsoever.81 This means that not only can an individual be deemed to have capacity in one state and not
in another, but he or she can also be deemed to have capacity by one
agency and not by another within the same state, or even within the
same county.82 Additionally, of the tests that do exist, all are com75
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(1) (McKinney 2011) (requiring consent to engage in sexual
activity).
76
See Lyden, supra note 68, at 4.
77
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(b), (3)(b).
78
See
NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
http://www.omr.state.ny.us (last modified Nov. 10, 2010). The OPWDD only recently received this name in July, 2010. Governor Paterson Signs Historic Name Change Into Law,
NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, (last modified Nov. 17, 2010)
http://omr.state.ny.us/news/name_change.jsp. Note that because this name change is new,
New York statutes conferring authority upon this office to monitor residences and develop
rules and regulations governing services for the developmentally disabled may still use its
previous name, the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities
(“OMRDD”).
79
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
80
Lyden, supra note 68, at 5.
81
See Carrie H. Kennedy, Legal and Psychological Implications in the Assessment of
Sexual Consent in the Cognitively Impaired Population, 10 ASSESSMENT 352, 353 (2003),
available at http://asm.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/4/352 (stating that some states
lack any precedent on record).
82
See id. at 353; Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7 (stating that examiners can
be swayed by the agency he or she works for, often making their opinion outcome determin-
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pletely subjective and lack any form of standardization.83 This lack
of objectivity can easily lead to grave consequences with the undeserved denial of an individual‟s right to engage in a sexual relationship.84
Although there is no consistent standard, some evaluators are
directed to examine and establish five principles of consent before
deeming an individual capable of consenting:
[1] Awareness of the nature of sexual acts and the
ability to choose to engage or abstain; [2] understanding of how you prevent unwanted pregnancies and
STI‟s; [3] understanding of the need to restrict sexual
behavior to certain times and places; [4] understanding
that certain sexual behaviors are illegal in this state;
and [5] the ability to identify harmful situations and to
avoid being exploited and harmed.85
The general purpose of evaluating these five principles is to allow the
individual to demonstrate an understanding of the conduct in which
he or she seeks to engage, and that he or she comprehends and will
accept responsibility for the consequences that may result from the
sexual conduct.86
A consent assessment generally employs one or more of three
information gathering methods: 1) a review of medical records; 2) assessments made by people who know and have worked with the individual, usually including staff members at an agency with which he
or she is closely associated; and/or 3) interviews with a person able to
evaluate the individual‟s mental status, perceivable knowledge, and
ative because many agencies do not like to allow individuals to pass the test).
83
Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7 (“Q: So the test is not standardized? A:
It‟s not even objective.”).
84
Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353; see generally Lyden, supra note 68, at 3-4 (“There is a
presumption in American law that an individual has the prerequisite capacity to engage in a
sexual relationship once he/she reaches the age of consent. An adult is entitled to all of his
or her rights and privileges under the law, unless limitations are imposed by a court of
law . . . .”).
85
Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7. In the interview, Ms. Guimela further
discussed a couple that she is currently working with and their failure of the consent test despite adequate knowledge: “Now, I will tell you that the two people that I saw, I could sit
down and talk to them and they could answer all of those things appropriately, and yet their
individual agencies said that they did not pass their consent test.” Id.
86
Id.
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understanding of consequences.87 However, the most likely assessor
is a representative of the agency providing services to the individual,
or the agency to which the individual has the closest personal connection.88
Some consent assessments use pictures, videos, and examples
to evaluate an individual‟s level of understanding.89 One test utilized
in New York examines whether the individual understands the physical aspects of sex and sexual organs as well as the different levels of
intimacy, pregnancy, birth control, and sexually transmitted diseases.90 However, many tests also include observations gathered by a
team of people that are closely associated with the disabled individual, such as counselors and staff of his or her school or day program,
in order to create an assessment based upon the observer‟s personal
knowledge of the disabled individual‟s understanding of a sexual relationship.91
Agencies that are governed by OPWDD regulations have the
responsibility to both protect those receiving its services while also
encouraging their sexual rights.92 Often, these two notions live in
conflict with one another. Although staff and examiners have a duty
to affirm individual sexual rights and are “tasked with promoting patient rights to include sexual rights,”93 in practice, very few patients
pass the consent test.94 Unfortunately, a common outcome is the improper determination of incapacity.95 This may be the result of improper training, or the notion that facility representatives charged
with giving the assessment worry more about the potential liability

87

Lyden, supra note 68, at 10.
See Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353.
89
See, e.g., Dorothy Griffiths, Ph.D. & Yona Lunsky, Ph.D., Socio-Sexual Knowledge
and Attitudes Assessment Tool-Revised (on file with author) [hereinafter Griffiths Consent
Test]; see also Kennedy, supra note 81, at 354, Table 2 (identifying that the test used for the
study in the paper used pictures and anatomically correct dolls).
90
Griffiths Consent Test, supra note 89, at 2-3, 5-9.
91
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
92
Lyden, supra note 68, at 17.
93
Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(3)
(2011) (“It is the responsibility of the agency/facility or sponsoring agency to ensure that
rights [of sexuality] are not arbitrarily denied.”).
94
Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7 (indicating that many agencies purposefully make it very difficult to pass the assessments).
95
See Lyden, supra note 68, at 9.
88
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upon the agency than a true evaluation of capacity.96 Often, “the
rights of people with intellectual disabilities have been abridged [by
agencies] under the guise of protecting [other] individuals” within
their care.97 Once an individual is deemed capable to engage in sexual conduct, the responsibility lies with the agency charged with his
or her supervision should any problems, such as deviant sexual behavior, arise.98 Agencies tend to weigh these competing interests by
showing preference for protection of others over the empowerment of
sexual rights.99
With many people being unable to pass the consent tests, it
seems as though there is a hidden agenda within this testing process.
The lack of standardization and objectivity allows for significant deference to be given to the assessor and permits agencies to develop
tests that are too difficult to pass. By finding each individual unable
to consent, the agency can avoid extra staff training to assist those in
sexual relationships and a group home may then deny making any
modifications to their residences to accommodate the couple.100 With
the high risk of error in the potential hindrance of an individual‟s
sexual rights, there is a clear need for reform in this practice. Most
critics suggest standardization of the tests, or at least the creation of
an objective standard on which to evaluate these cases.101 Much of
the issues that arise with the subjective assessor can be avoided by
requiring that the assessor be an objective third party, working independently of a private agency, to conduct the tests. However, while
some argue that consent testing is an absolute necessity, 102 consent
test procedures imposed by agencies should be abolished completely
because of the undue burden placed upon the right to marry. Only
when a state legislature decides that consent testing should be a prerequisite to obtaining a marriage license does this practice seem ethi96
Kennedy, supra note 81, at 353 (“Unfortunately, there is usually no assessment completed, and decisions are made by nonprofessionals, such as direct care workers, and tend to
be polarized (i.e., either ignore the activity or completely restrict all intimate activity).”); Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
97
Lyden, supra note 68, at 17.
98
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
99
See Lyden, supra note 68, at 17.
100
Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
101
See, e.g., Lyden, supra note 68, at 16 (suggesting a standard that would be appropriate
across jurisdictions).
102
Id. at 9.
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cal.
One glaring problem with the practice of consent testing is the
unfair burden placed on individuals seeking to engage in activities for
which they have affirmative rights, including the fundamental right to
marry103 and the right of individuals with developmental disabilities
to have a sexual relationship.104 Agencies are requiring disabled individuals to demonstrate that they have the capacity to engage in such
an activity while no such process exists for non-disabled individuals.
As one social worker involved in the field of sexual education and
consent testing elaborates:
The law does not require you to prove that you can
iron, and wash clothes, and cook dinners, and balance
a budget, and wash the floor before you can get married. You don‟t have to prove that you‟re competent
in any of those areas, and yet that‟s what we‟re telling
them. So we‟re not treating them like everyone else.
We‟re singling them out and we‟re denying them their
rights based on criteria that have nothing to do with
marriage.105
However, in the likelihood that the consent testing practice
will continue, there is an increased need for sexual education among
the mentally disabled, particularly for those seeking to engage in sexual relationships. While this may seem like a taboo and uncomfortable topic for many, sexual activity among the disabled is unavoidable.106 Interestingly, “those about whom society has the greatest
ambivalence with respect to sex education have the greatest need for
it.”107 Because an individual‟s lack of knowledge and understanding
can lead to being deemed incapable, “[i]t is reasonable to presume
that the persons whose sexual consent capacity is in question have an
implied right to access services to assess their capacity and support
103

See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the right to marry is a fundamental constitutionally protected right that may not be inhibited without a rational basis
for a legitimate state interest).
104
See tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(4)(xi)(a) (stating that no person receiving services from the state
“shall be denied . . . [the] freedom to express sexuality”).
105
Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
106
See Munro, supra note 9.
107
BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 290.
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them in achieving capacity if identified deficiencies can be ameliorated.”108 It is clear, and even expected, that the empowerment of
sexual rights should be fully supported by providing adequate services. Such sexual education services would be necessary on a regular
basis for the occupants living in the group home proposed by this
Comment.
III.

LIVING OPTIONS FOR MARRIED COUPLES WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN NEW YORK

The right to live with one‟s spouse in one‟s preferred environment should naturally be included with the right to marry. Married couples with developmental disabilities may live together, but
their options for residences in which they can cohabitate while also
receiving the services they each require is lacking, to say the least.
Several options are available for unmarried individuals with
developmental disabilities who are unable to live independently and
require some sort of continuing home care. These options can include: living with a family member, in a state-operated institution, in
a supportive residential facility (also known as a supportive apartment),109 or in a group home. This list, however, shrinks significantly
when a married couple, requiring continuous care, seeks a residence
in which they can cohabitate as a married couple. For this group,
choice of residence is essentially limited to two options: living with a
family member or living in a group home, assuming that the pair can
find a group home that has available space and will allow them to
live there. However, because the majority of group homes are operated by independent organizations, most will not welcome a married
couple.110

108

Lyden, supra note 68, at 9.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 686.99(l)(2)(ii) (2011) (defining “supportive community residence” as “a facility providing independent living under variable
amounts of oversight delivered in accordance with the person‟s needs for such supervision”).
Supportive community residences, however, do not apply to the groups within the scope of
this Comment, as these groups require a “supervised community residence” with a staff that
typically lives within the facility and is “available at all times when the persons are present.”
See id. at (l)(2)(i).
110
Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
109

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 [2012], Art. 7

470

TOURO LAW REVIEW
A.

Vol. 28

Option One: Living with a Family Member

In the care for children and adults with mental disabilities,
there is an emphasis on rearing the child in the family home and delaying out-of-home placement.111 “Although out-of-home placement
is virtually inevitable for all dependent [mentally disabled] adults,”112
many choose to remain in the family home as long as possible and
continue to live with their parents after leaving the public school system, typically at the age of twenty-one.113 While the parents of disabled children are given cash subsidies to aid with finances, providing adequate care for a person with developmental disabilities can be
significantly burdensome on a family member in many ways; financially, emotionally, and in some cases, physically.114 This is particularly true for elderly parents of adult children with severe mental
and/or physical disabilities.115 As the life expectancy of those with
mental disabilities continues to rise, so too does the responsibility
placed on the aging parent.116 Parents of children with mental disabilities are often referred to as “perpetual parents” because their parental responsibilities never seem to diminish, unlike how those of
parents with non-disabled children naturally do.117 Many disabled
adults will permanently require assistance with basic life skills such
as bathing, dressing, and cooking, placing a significant burden on
parents and family members, and particularly on those parents who
do not receive family support services.118
Parents of disabled children experience the same worries as
111

BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 300.
Id.
113
Janet Elder, Retarded Adults Test Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1986, at C1.
114
Disabilities - Impact of Disabilities on Families, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://family.Jrank.org/pages/396/Disabilities-Impact-Disabilities-onFamilies.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
115
See Nancy P. Kropf & Timothy B. Kelly, Stigmatized and Perpetual Parents: Older
Parents Caring for Adult Children with Life-Long Disabilities, 24(1/2) J. OF
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 3, 3-4
(Jan.
1,
1995),
available
at
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=ssw_facpub.
116
Id. at 4.
117
Id. at 5.
118
See id.; BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 300. Some family support services include
respite care (temporary care, either within or outside of the family home, giving families the
opportunity to take a break from the stresses of continuous care), parent counseling, parent
training, and case management. Id.
112
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all parents.119 Nevertheless, these stressors are heightened when caring for a disabled child—because of his or her innate vulnerability—
and are indefinitely prolonged.120 “Such fears can be crippling to
both parents and children.”121 However, when living with parents,
mentally disabled individuals have a high potential for being denied
the important developmental services provided by a community residential facility.122 A dangerous result can be a lack of stimulation necessary for the growth and development of the mentally disabled
adult: “Some mentally retarded people have not been stimulated in
the right ways [when living with parents], and appear to be less capable than they really are.”123 The absence of services, such as those
provided by a group home, can be detrimental to the development of
an individual‟s vocational and life skills.124 Some say that life at
home with a family member has the potential to be equally as restrictive as life in an institutional setting, resulting, in essence, in these
individuals becoming a prisoner in their own homes.125 While this
may be extreme, the possible impact of these restrictions is heightened when a parent must care for a married couple that should be receiving individualized services specific to meet their needs.126
If a couple with developmental disabilities decides to marry
and a group home is an unlikely option for them, they will likely be
forced to reside with a parent or family member—assuming that the
parent is willing to take on the responsibility of caring for yet another
disabled person. This action effectively causes every fear, anxiety,
and stressor innate in caring for a person with mental disabilities to
119
Elder, supra note 113 (including such stressors as, “fear of financial exploitation, sexual involvement, even simply not eating balanced meals”).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive
Rights: A Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 278 (2004).
123
Elder, supra note 113 (quoting Jim Young, whom, at the time of the interview, was the
deputy executive director of the President‟s Commission for Mental Retardation); see also
Weber, supra note 122, at 278 (“Often, parents or other caregivers are elderly and cannot
provide life-enriching activities including access to recreation, habilitation training, and employment.”).
124
Weber, supra note 122, at 278.
125
Id.
126
See discussion infra Part III.B.ii.c (discussing the public policy of providing services to
meet individual needs in order to allow a disabled individual to function at his or her highest
level).
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be doubled. An attempt to then take on the responsibility of caring
for yet another individual with a mental disability can seem like an
incredibly overwhelming task.127 Because of this, a much healthier
and viable option would be for a married couple to live in a group
home.
B.

Option Two: Group Homes

The lack of parental willingness to take on the responsibility
of caring for two disabled adults naturally creates a significant reliance upon community residential facilities, commonly known as
group homes. These homes are facilities that provide “housing, supplies and services for persons who are developmentally disabled and
who, in addition to these basic requirements, need supportive interpersonal relationships, supervision, and training assistance in the activities of daily living.”128 Typically, these homes are located in residential areas and house a maximum of fourteen occupants. 129 Group
homes of this kind, mostly classified as “supervised community residence[s],” are fully staffed around the clock to assist residents with
all of their daily functional needs.130 These needs typically include
preparing meals, bathing, bringing residents to doctor visits, shopping, and recreational activities. Most importantly, group homes seek
to “provide a home environment” and have a policy of encouraging
residents “to live as independently as possible.”131
1.

The History of Group Homes

For a large part of America‟s history, the mentally disabled
and mentally ill populations were segregated from society and institutionalized because of a belief that they should remain isolated due to
their inadequate contribution to society.132 It was not until the 1950‟s
127

But cf. MONICA AND DAVID (CineMia 2010). This documentary followed the lives of a
two individuals with Down syndrome in their journey of beginning a life together. Id. The
pair married and David, the new husband, moved in with his new wife‟s parents. Id. Her
parents accepted David and provided adequate care for him without hesitation. Id.
128
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 686.99(l) (2011).
129
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 686.3(a)(5)(i) (2011).
130
Id. at § 686.99(l)(2)(i).
131
Id. at § 686.99(l)(1)-(2).
132
See Richard Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Com-
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that there was a call for reform and an attempt to eliminate the stigma
attached to the mentally disabled community.133 Prompted by exposés revealing the appalling conditions, overcrowding, and neglect
of patients by American mental hospitals, the deinstitutionalization
movement called for the removal of patients from state mental institutions with preference for placement in less-restrictive environments.134 The healthcare system for the mentally disabled underwent
major changes, with reformers specifically seeking to develop new
alternatives to mental hospitals and institutions, including community
care.135
Out of this movement grew a focus on community-based care
as a desirable alternative to institutional treatment.136 In the 1960‟s,
the government took the position that the confinement of the mentally
disabled in institutions should be a last resort.137 In 1963, President
John F. Kennedy “proposed a bold new program for establishing
community based treatment facilities,” resulting in the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction
Act.138 Though the Act has since been repealed, it represented a significant step away from institutionalization, as it was the first official
sign of federal commitment to creating community residence alternatives.139
Another significant act of Congress was the enactment of the
Home and Community-Based Services (“HCBS”) Waiver Program,140 which provides Medicaid reimbursement to states for the
purpose of funding community-based services for the developmentally disabled that states would not otherwise receive through Medicaid.141 The states then administer these waivers to individuals who
munity, 16 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 193, 198 (1980-81).
133
Hortas, supra note 11, at 161.
134
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits on Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and
Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L. J. 375, 378-80 (1982).
135
See Hortas, supra note 11, at 161.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Rhoden, supra note 134, at n.14.
139
See id.; Rapson, supra note 132, at 203.
140
Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2176, 95 Stat. 813 (1981) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
1396n(c)(1) (2006)).
141
Luana Olivas, Note, Helping Them Rest in Peace: Confronting the Hidden Crisis Facing Aging Parents of Disabled Children, 10 ELDER L.J. 393, 402 (2002). In order for a state
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have chosen community care over institutional living in order to provide them with individualized support services.142 With this federal
incentive, many states began reorganizing their programs, further
deinstitutionalizing many patients and providing them with a community-based alternative for their treatment.143 Particularly within
the last twenty years, with the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the decision of the landmark case, Olmstead v.
L.C.,144 group homes have become an essential function of the
healthcare system and the services provided for the developmentally
disabled, and are now a necessary preference to institutional living.145
a.

The Americans with Disabilities Act and the
Community Integration Mandate

In 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) after finding that, “historically, society has tended to
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem . . .
in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization . . . .”146 This congressional finding marked the first time that Congress expressly referred
to segregation via institutionalization as a form of discrimination.147
“Institutionalization almost by definition entails segregation and isolation. Not only is segregation of the sexes prevalent, but segregation
from families, normal society and peer groups is also a product of institutionalization.”148
to receive these waivers, it must apply for a specific number of waiver slots and show that
the cost of providing the community-based services is less than the cost of providing institutionally-based services per capita. Id.
142
See Home and Community Based Services Waiver (OPWDD), N.Y. STATE DEP‟T OF
HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/program/longterm/omrdd.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2012) (explaining the HCBS in New York).
143
Brief for Respondent at *4, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), 1999
WL 144128, at *4.
144
527 U.S. 581 (1999).
145
Id. at 607 (holding that states have an affirmative obligation to provide communitybased living options to those who would benefit from them as opposed to institutional living).
146
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3).
147
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 589 n.1.
148
Brief for Respondent, supra note 143, at *9.
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In drafting the ADA, Congress recognized that even with the
notable progress made in the area of the rights of the mentally disabled, the stigma that accompanies this handicap remains prevalent in
today‟s society.149 The pervasiveness of this stigma has caused isolation and substantial discrimination against those individuals with disabilities, often resulting in “outright intentional exclusion, . . . overprotective rules and policies . . . [and] segregation.”150 Similarly,
Congress asserted that the proper goals in achieving a positive view
of the disabled population should be “to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and . . . [to impose a] national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”151 This has since become a pervasive theme in
legislation throughout the country.
In enacting the ADA, Congress instructed the Attorney General to implement anti-discrimination regulations in order to enforce
the legislation.152 The Department of Justice then implemented the
“integration regulation,” which requires public entities to “administer
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”153
However, an entity may escape making modifications to its programs
“necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability” if it
shows that “the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of the service, program, or activity.”154 It is clear from this instruction that Congress had the intent to hold federal and state agencies
accountable for providing these vitally important integration services.
b.

Olmstead: Applying the Integration Regulation

In June of 1999, the United States Supreme Court issued a

149
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3), (5). In its findings, Congress officially acknowledged
this stigma by stating that, “census data, national polls, and other studies have documented
that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.” Id. at §
12101(a)(6).
150
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
151
Id. at § 12101(a)(8), (b)(1).
152
Id. at §12134(a).
153
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (emphasis added).
154
Id. at § 35.130(b)(7).
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landmark decision, in Olmstead v. L.C., involving two mentally disabled women that were voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital.155 The plaintiffs sought removal from institutional living after an
evaluation determining that each would benefit from a communitybased setting under the ADA.156 Despite having received this evaluation, both reluctantly remained institutionalized and challenged their
“continued confinement in a segregated environment,” maintaining
that the State‟s refusal to allow them to move to an integrated community-based setting violated their rights under Title II of the
ADA.157
The Court held that a State‟s confinement of individuals with
disabilities to institutions when a community-based setting would be
more appropriate (what the Court refers to as “unjustified isolation”)
constitutes discrimination based upon disability and, therefore, violates Title II of the ADA.158 Additionally, the Court held that states
are required to make reasonable modifications to their services unless
it would fundamentally alter the state‟s delivery and implementation
of its services and programs,159 reinforcing the Department of Justice‟s enforcement of the ADA. In evaluating whether a state may
use this defense, a court may take into account “the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.”160
This holding thereby gave states an affirmative obligation to provide
treatment in a community setting when such a setting is deemed more
appropriate and within reason.161
In its reasoning, the Court stated that this holding emphasizes
two important principles: “First, institutional placement of persons
who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or
unworthy of participating in community life [and] . . . [s]econd, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life ac155

527 U.S. at 593.
Id.
157
Id. at 593-94.
158
Id. at 597, 607.
159
Id. at 603-04. This defense cannot be established by mere cost, and must instead create
an “undue hardship” upon the state in order for its compliance with the mandate. Olmstead,
527 U.S. at 606 n.16.
160
Id. at 607.
161
Id.
156
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tivities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts,
work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and
cultural enrichment.”162 In keeping with the goals enumerated in the
ADA, the Court continued to place a focus on promoting the independence and social wellbeing of the mentally disabled.
After Olmstead, a call for significant change extended to state
legislatures in an attempt to comply with the Court‟s community integration mandate; however, the response was, and continues to be
slow.163 With the increased demand for group homes and other residential facilities, already lengthy waiting lists for group homes continued to grow, causing a housing crisis that is still felt today. 164 This
is due, in large part, to a lack of guidance and clarity in which state
changes will “cross the line from reasonable modification to fundamental alteration, when a waiting list is moving at a reasonable pace,
or what constitutes an effectively working plan.”165 By using the
fundamental alteration defense, states have been able to skirt some
responsibility in making modifications. Unfortunately, “[l]ower
courts have generally decided that evidence of states‟ active commitment, yet slow progress towards community integration, satisfies
the ADA,” which in effect supports, rather than sanctions a state‟s reluctance to change.166

162

Id. at 600-01.
On the fifth anniversary of the Olmstead decision, the director of the Bazelon Center
for Mental Health Law stated, “[m]ost states are enacting reforms at a snail‟s pace, defying
the spirit of the ruling and preventing Americans with mental illnesses from participating in
their communities . . . these [limited efforts] have produced little actual movement of people
. . . into integrated community settings.” Legal Advocate Cites Ongoing Segregation on Eve
of Olmstead Anniversary, BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW (June 21, 2004),
http://bazelon.org.gravitatehosting.com/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bRBHCViwpf4%3d&tabi
d=328.
164
See The Housing Crisis for New Yorkers with Disabilities, NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
(Nov.
17,
2011),
http://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/docs/miller_nyail_barriers_to_aai_
housing.pdf (finding that there is very limited housing available to people with disabilities,
keeping them from living independently, and resulting in “22,248 New Yorkers living in
nursing facilities who have indicated they wish to return to the community”).
165
Samantha A. DiPolito, Deinstitutionalization and Community Integration: An Awakening of the Nation’s Conscience?, 58 MERCER L. REV. 1381, 1399 (2007).
166
Id.
163
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How Group Homes Operate

Most group homes are not operated by the State, but instead
are typically developed, owned, and managed by authorized providers—usually private agencies that receive state funding.167 Regardless of their private status, group homes must function within the
overarching guidelines enumerated by the state agency given the authority to enact such guidelines by the state legislature.168
a.

Funding

States have traditionally received federal funding for the purpose of operating institutions.169 However, in 1981, Congress
enacted the Home and Community Based Services (“HCBS”) Waiver
Program, which “allows [a] state to utilize a portion of its Medicaid
funds, which would have been for institutional use, to provide community-based services instead.”170 To obtain a waiver, the State must
show that the funds will go to community-based treatment for those
who would otherwise need institutional care, and that the cost of
those community services will not exceed the annual cost of the institution-based services.171 However, this waiver program is optional
and it is within the State‟s discretion to determine the ways in which
it will use its federal funding.172 Additionally, “when individuals
with developmental disabilities move from an institution into the
community, federal law allows them to take with them the dollars
used for their care in the institution. Thus, the „money follows the
person‟ through the transition.”173 Moreover, under Olmstead, in order for the State to use federal funding for community-based pro167

See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 671.99(t) (2012) (defining an
authorized provider as “[a]n incorporated or State government entity, holding a facilityspecific operating certificate from [OPWDD] . . . to deliver community residential habilitation services . . . .”).
168
See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 13.07(a), (c) (McKinney 2011) (giving
OPWDD the authority to develop programs and provide housing for people with developmental disabilities).
169
Olivias, supra note 141, at 401.
170
DiPolito, supra note 165, at 1402.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
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grams—while remaining in accordance with ADA mandates requiring that reasonable modifications be made—a State may “demonstrate that it ha[s] a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive
settings, and a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State‟s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated.”174
In New York, OPWDD has the responsibility of developing
effective services for the developmentally disabled by adopting rules
and regulations necessary to implement the delivery of these services
to the mentally handicapped population.175 OPWDD relies upon other agencies from the public and private sectors, including non-profit
and for-profit organizations, to carry out community-based programs
and establish residential facilities for the developmentally disabled.176
When a private agency opens a group home, the start-up funding and
daily costs initially come from private entities, giving each group
home the ability to create its own guidelines for the home‟s operation, so long as those guidelines satisfy the general requirements
enumerated by OPWDD.177 In order to receive funding from
OPWDD, the provider must be authorized and certified by OPWDD
and have a qualified staff.178 In addition to the administrative requirements, the group home must also sufficiently show that its services promote each of the four goals listed in the statute: independence, integration, individualization, and productivity.179

174

Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 605-06.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 13.07(a) (McKinney 2011) (conferring authority upon
OPWDD to “assure development of comprehensive plans, programs, and services . . . [for]
individuals with developmental disabilities”).
176
See Frequently Asked Questions, NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES, http://www.opwdd.ny.gov/hp_faqs.jsp (last modified June 17, 2011).
177
See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 686.2(a) (2012) (stating that the
guidelines enumerated by OPWDD “set forth the specific minimum requirements with
which a facility . . . in the community residence . . . class, certified by [OPWDD], shall
comply”).
178
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 671.4(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (2012).
179
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 671.6(a)(6)(ii)(a)-(d) (2012).
175
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OPWDD Regulations for Group Homes in New
York

OPWDD “set[s] forth specific minimum requirements with
which a facility . . . in the community residence . . . class, certified by
[OPWDD], shall comply.”180 While there are several regulations
with what seems like a lot of language, there are only a few basic requirements. An authorized provider (public, private, and state agencies) must obtain, and continue to maintain, a certificate of operation
from OPWDD, regardless of whether that entity is receiving, or plans
to receive, funding from the State.181 In order to maintain its certificate of operation, an authorized provider will not be subject to regular
inspection; however, OPWDD reserves the right to survey the facility
at any time.182 Additionally, staff must be qualified and, in a supervised community residence, must be available at all times while residents are present.183
Many of the OPWDD regulations provide general guidelines
for the start-up and operation of a group home, as well as administrative requirements and remedies. By establishing only minimum requirements, there is significant deference given to the private agencies to develop their own regulations. However, group home staff
members and care providers are also tasked with affirming the rights
of persons receiving services, such as being provided with a safe and
sanitary environment, having an individualized plan of services,184
and freedom from unnecessary restraint or medication.185 Also included in these rights is the access to sexual instruction and family
planning services, which necessarily encompasses the “freedom to
express sexuality” and “make decisions regarding conception.”186
Unfortunately, this right is statutorily limited by the competing right
180

tit. 14 § 686.2(a) (emphasis added).
Id. at (e).
182
Id. at (e)(2).
183
tit. 14 § 671.4(a)(1)(ii); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 686.9(a)(4) (2012).
184
Persons with disabilities living in residential facilities must have a written and individualized treatment plan with the goal of “maximization of the person‟s abilities to cope with
his or her environment, foster[] social competency . . . [and] enable[] him or her to live as
independently as possible.” tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(4)(viii).
185
Id. at (a)(4)(i), (iv)-(v), (viii).
186
Id. at (a)(4)(xi)(a)-(b).
181
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of facilities enabling the entity to limit sexual expression in order to
maintain proper management of the group home.187
Even with this limitation on sexual expression, there are no
statutory roadblocks that would prevent a married couple from living
in a group home, nor are there any statutory references to the denial
of a group home specifically for married couples. The only opposition to the development of this type of group home would essentially
have to be generated by the independent agencies using their professional judgment to deny its creation.
c.

Policy of Individualized Treatment and Maximum
Independence

One goal of community integration is to administer services
in the least restrictive environment: an environment that “permits the
greatest degree of independence consistent with one‟s decisionmaking capacity.”188 The key in implementing this goal is to find a
balance between independence and control.189 Many agencies choose
to promote independence through “normalization,” a practice that
“seeks to reduce the „differentness‟ associated with disability and to
promote personal competence such that the disabled individual can
live a life that more nearly approximates that of his or her nondisabled counterpart.”190 With special attention given to the means and
contexts of the services provided, the goal is to improve that person‟s
quality of life, promote independence, and encourage personal autonomy by allowing the individual to exercise greater freedom of
choice.191 With this type of person-centered planning, “there is a
concerted effort to build the service around the person‟s wishes
. . . .”192 In this context, “[s]upport means not only honoring choices
but enabling them”193 A person-centered program will attempt to encourage normal life and tailor services around the individual‟s specif-

187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at (a)(4)(xi)(c).
BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 246.
Id.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 254.
BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 254.
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ic needs.194 Additionally, there is a focus on “shift[ing] the emphasis
away from the person‟s disabilities and toward [his or her] capabilities.”195
In its regulations, OPWDD has a clear policy of focusing on
services that will “promote and encourage . . . independence, integration, individualization, and productivity.”196 With an intent to create
a family atmosphere that most resembles a home for its residents, the
main goal in the group home setting is for each individual to feel
comfortable in his or her new living situation in order to promote an
atmosphere of growth and self-development. One method of reaching this goal is through the creation of a specific individualized service plan for each resident.197 While such a plan may typically deal
with medical care for the disabled individual, it will also necessarily
include any other services and programs essential to his or her development.
With a policy of creating an individualized plan, it should logically follow that living environments be modified to create an optimal living situation for each individual. For a person seeking to
marry and live with his or her spouse in a group home setting, a
group home exclusively for married residents is likely an ideal living
situation. Not only will it furnish an appropriate setting in which to
provide individualized services, such as sexual education and relationship training, but it will also promote the sense of autonomy that
each group home strives to achieve for each of its residents. By requiring group homes to operate with these personalized policies in
mind, the OPWDD regulations can even be seen to require that this
type of group home be made available to this distinct group of people
simply because they request it.

194

Id. at 255.
Id.
196
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 671.5(a)(3) (2011). The State wants residents
to strive to become autonomous by asserting their values: “activities . . . which promote the
person‟s ability to assess and utilize his or her strengths and capacity to make life status
changes and to increase self-awareness about his or her values and preferences. Id. at
(a)(4)(vi).
197
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 633.4(a)(4)(viii).
195
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LIKELY ARGUMENTS AGAINST A GROUP HOME
FOR MARRIED COUPLES
A.

The Fundamental Alteration Defense

When evaluating whether to develop a new group home, such
as the one proposed in this Comment, the State or the private agency198 will attempt to argue that the requested accommodations will
amount to a fundamental modification in the State‟s services and
programs.199 Initially, the State and/or agency will do a cost-benefit
analysis,200 and likely conclude that the costs of hiring new employees, training, and potentially constructing a new building for the
home will outweigh the benefits for the individuals seeking this living accommodation.201
The State‟s responsibility to accommodate individuals with
appropriate community-based care is not without limits.202 To avoid
implementing a modification, the State may show that the modification is unreasonable because it would create a “fundamental alteration” to the State‟s services and programs.203 In Olmstead, the Court
acknowledged that a fundamental alteration under the ADA should
be interpreted pursuant to previous readings of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1976,204 which includes the defense of undue
hardship.205 Under this section, evaluation of an undue hardship requires more than a mere assessment of the program‟s projected cost
in relation to the state‟s total budget.206 It also requires a:
198
For the purpose of this Comment, it should be assumed that a private agency will be
subjected to the same regulations as the State because it carries out a public function that is
historically an exclusive function of the government, as required for state action under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978).
199
See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603.
200
See id. at 597 (requiring that the State “not only [review] the cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others
with mental disabilities, and the State‟s obligation to mete out those services equitably”).
201
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
202
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603.
203
Id.
204
29 U.S.C § 794 (1994).
205
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.16.
206
Id.
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case-by-case analysis weighing factors that include:
(1) [t]he overall size of the recipient‟s program with
respect to number of employees, number and type of
facilities, and size of budget; (2) [t]he type of the recipient‟s operation, including the composition and structure of the recipient‟s workforce; and (3) [t]he nature
and cost of the accommodation needed.207
Additionally, the State has the burden of showing that the requested
accommodation “would be inequitable in light of available resources
and the State‟s responsibility to care for a large and diverse population of other persons with disabilities as well as the State‟s responsibility to provide services in an equitable manner.”208 Furthermore,
cases relied upon by Congress in enacting the ADA hold that cost defenses may only outweigh ADA duties when the cost is substantially
higher than the projected benefits.209
Here, it is unlikely that the projected costs of providing a
small number of these group homes would outweigh the potential
benefits to the residents. While hiring and training will certainly be
required, it is doubtful that there will be a high demand for several of
these group homes within the state due to the rarity of married
couples with mental disabilities. This requires only a limited number
of homes to be developed. Furthermore, the individuals that would
be living in the group home would all be entitled to community-based
care and would inevitably require out-of-home placement, therefore
already necessitating the hiring of new employees and additional
training. The most significant cost would be the actual construction
of the group home or renovation of a current structure in order to accommodate the unique living arrangements required by a married
couple. However, it is difficult to see how this cost will outweigh the
benefits of autonomy, independence, and individualized services that
each resident will receive. Even if the cost is determined to outweigh
the benefits, it is unlikely that it will meet the lofty threshold as to
substantially outweigh the benefits.

207
208
209

Id.
DiPolito, supra note 165, at 1396.
Weber, supra note 122, at 288.
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Liability for Improper Sexual Behavior

The State or agency operating a group home has the oftenconflicting responsibilities of protecting those within its care from
harm, while also promoting the sexual expression of its residents.210
As a result, the State and/or agency may attempt to rely on its ability
to limit a resident‟s sexual expression when it conflicts with the
proper management of the home.211 This reaction would likely be
based upon some fear of the potential for sexual aggression and sexually deviant behavior.212 However, such a fear is unfounded and
based upon an assumption that a person capable of consenting to sexual activity will become a sexual deviant, putting other residents of
the group home in danger.213
This belief is reminiscent of the Eugenics Era, when the public viewed “the mentally retarded as criminally oriented and sexually
promiscuous.”214 This is precisely the viewpoint that Congress and
state legislatures have been trying to wipe clean from society‟s palette. Additionally, “there is no indication of an increased frequency
of sexual offenses in retarded youth relative to their non-handicapped
counterparts.”215 In fact, several studies have found that married
mentally disabled individuals are generally happier and have fewer
social and personal problems, such as breaking the law and issues
with substance abuse.216 Furthermore, it is even less likely that a
married person in a group home will develop sexual aggression due
to the fact that he or she has already demonstrated an understanding
210

Lynden, supra note 68, at 17.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, 633.4 (a)(4)(xi)(c).
212
See Elizabeth J. Reed, Note, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded
Persons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799, 806 (“Retarded individuals are
believed to be at greater risk of being sexually abused, especially in institutional settings,
making it difficult [for the State] to grant them too much sexual autonomy for fear of
abuse.”).
213
See Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 59 (discussing the potential for sexual
misconduct in a group home setting, but stating that this is not plausible here because of the
nature of the marital relationship).
214
Reed, supra note 212, at 803.
215
BAROFF & OLLEY, supra note 3, at 292. In 1996, Baroff and Olley conducted a study
of North Carolina adult prison inmates. Id. Only two percent of the mentally disabled adults
that were imprisoned were charged with sexual offenses, which is approximately the same
percentage as the nondisabled population. Id.
216
See Munro, supra note 9.
211
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of sexual activity and of the sanctity of marriage, having been
deemed capable to give consent.
The argument that individuals able to consent to sexual relationships will cause a danger within the group home is surprising, to
say the least, because of the contradiction it presents. Many group
homes have both male and female residents.217 Is there not the same
danger in those group homes as there would be for having married
couples living in a group home together? In fact, it can be argued
that the danger is even greater in a home with unmarried individuals,
because they likely have not been determined to have capacity to engage in sexual relationships, and are therefore less likely to have had
any formal sexual education training. Even with this clear danger,
the State and private agencies still made the decision to open the
group home to opposite sex residents. What exactly is stopping them
with a group home for married couples?
V.

CONCLUSION

Treatment of the developmentally disabled has improved significantly throughout American history. With a new outlook geared
towards promoting independence and cultivating individual needs,
Congress and state legislatures have taken pro-active steps to improve the quality of life for the disabled population. While marriage
statutes may still reek of eugenics ideals, mentally disabled couples
have become more prevalent and marriage has become a more accepted notion.218
With the ultimate goals of normalization, improving quality
of life, and empowering autonomy while providing a family-like setting, a group home exclusively for married couples with developmental disabilities seems like the natural next-step in the progression of
rights and services provided for this population. The benefit of the
creation of such a group home will far outweigh any financial burden
it may impose on the state or private agency. Additionally, with New
York‟s focus on personalizing services and developing individualized
plans, it makes logical sense to provide what seems like the most personal accommodation available. These OPWDD regulations can
217
218

Interview with Bonnie Guimela, supra note 7.
See Munro, supra note 9.
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even be read as to require that this accommodation be provided for
this small group of people, simply because they are requesting it.
Unfortunately, the general public may not receive the proposition made in this Comment well, because of its somewhat taboo nature. However, there are no group homes of this kind in the country,
and any state or agency that may decide to develop such a group
home will be on the forefront of the expansion of civil rights for the
developmentally disabled, potentially creating a national trend.
Hopefully, the future will bring even more empowering change for
this group of people in need of a particular service, so that they too
can have the “normal” lives we all take for granted.
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